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BREACH OF CONFIDENCE-THE NEED FOR A NEW
TORT-Watts v. Cumberland County Hospital System.
INTRODUCTION
When a patient divulges embarrassing, intimate, or even in-
criminating information to a therapist he or she usually expects
that such disclosures will be kept completely confidential. A
wrongful disclosure by a therapist potentially injures a patient in
two distinct ways.' First, the patient is injured by the adverse ef-
fects flowing from the wrongful disclosure' and second, the wrong-
ful disclosure destroys the patient's expectation that communica-
tions will be kept confidential.' Since confidentiality is vital to the
adequate functioning of a patient-therapist relationship, the legal
protection of these confidences is necessary to promote a relation-
ship that is beneficial to society.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals in Watts v. Cumberland
County Hospital System, Inc.4 held that the disclosures of confi-
dential information by a family therapist about his patient to third
parties constituted an actionable wrong based in medical malprac-
tice.5 By characterizing the wrong as medical malpractice, the
North Carolina court bypassed an opportunity to establish a sepa-
rate breach of confidence tort which could include wrongful disclo-
sures in other confidential relationships such as lawyer-client,$
priest-penitentJ and school-student.8
Although courts have been willing to protect confidential rela-
tionships,9 the protection of the relationships has been accom-
1. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Clinger, 84 A.D.2d 482, 486, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805
(App. Div. 1982).
2. Id., 446 N.Y.S.2d at 804 (1982).
3. See generally Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on the Practice of Psy-
chiatry, 30 TEMPLE L.Q. 401, 405-06 (1956-57).
4. 75 N.C. App. 1, 330 S.E.2d 242 (1985).
5. Id. at 9, 330 S.E.2d at 249 (1985).
6. See, e.g., In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1977).
7. See, e.g., Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160, 417 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1979).
8. See, e.g., Blair v. Union Free School District No. 6, 67 Misc. 2d 248, 324
N.Y.S.2d 222 (D. Ct. 1971).
9. See, e.g., Peterson v. Idaho First Natl Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284
(1961); MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801; Union Free School Dist., 67
Misc. 2d 248, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222.
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plished in a rather haphazard fashion. 10 Various theories have been
advanced as bases to prevent wrongful disclosures. These tradi-
tionally have included invasion of privacy,1 breach of implied con-
tract,12 breach of the duty of confidentiality, 13 and causes of action
created by statute. 14 The courts have often relied upon more than
one theory in a single case and occasionally have mixed the
theories.' 5
The right to redress wrongfully disclosed confidences through
a separate breach of confidence tort is the topic of this Note. Not
all disclosures are actionable wrongs."" This Note will deal mainly
with extrajudicial disclosures of customarily confidential informa-
tion and will touch only superficially on testimonial privileges.
This Note also will examine the inadequacies of theories advanced
by many courts thus far as remedies for wrongful disclosures and
the justification for the development of a separate breach of confi-
10. See generally Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM.
L. REv. 1426, 1448-49 (1982).
11. See, e.g., Feeny v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (1920); Bar-
ber v. Time, 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942); Home v. Patton, 291 Ala. 701,
287 So. 2d 824 (1973); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct.
1977); Cayman v. Bernstein, 38 Ps. D. & C. 543 (1940); Tolley v. Provident Life &
Acci. Ins. Co., 154 So. 2d 617, writ refused, 244 La. 1019, 156 So.2d 226 (1963);
Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's Brooks Brothers, 492 A.2d 580, (D.C. App. 1985);
Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 68 Or. App. 573, 684 P.2d 581
(1984).
12. Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio
1965); Doe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 66; Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 Ill. App.
3d 435, 390 N.E.2d 945 (1979); Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912).
13. See, e.g., Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962); Smith v.
Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441, 162 P. 572 (1917); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331
P.2d 814 (1958); Alexander v. Knight, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962);
Felis v. Greenberg, 51 Misc. 2d 88, 273 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1966); Anker v. Brodnitz, 98
Misc. 2d 148, 413 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1979); MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d 482, 445 N.Y.S.2d
801; Fedell v. Wierzbieniec, 127 Misc. 2d 124, 485 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1985);
Humphers, 68 Or. App. 573, 684 P.2d 581; Hammonds, 243 F. Supp. 793.
14. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920); Shaf-
fer v. Spicer, 88 S.D. 36, 215 N.W.2d 134 (1974); Geisberger, 72 Ill. App. 3d 435,
390 N.E.2d 945; Shaw v. Glickman, 45 Md. App. 718, 415 A.2d 625 (1980).
15. See, e.g., Suburban Trust Co. v. Waller, 44 Md. App. 335, 408 A.2d 758
(Ct. Spec. App. 1979); Doe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668; Union Free School
Dist., 67 Misc. 2d 248, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222.
16. Union Free School Dist., 67 Misc. 2d 248, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222; see gener-
ally Wecht, Physician's Liability to Non-Patient Third Parties, 15 TiMAL 34
(1979).
[Vol. 8:145146
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dence tort in North Carolina.
THE CASE
In Watts v. Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc.,7 the
North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed the issue of wrongful
disclosure of confidential information by a family therapist.18 The
action was based upon the following facts:
In June 1974, the plaintiff, Linda Watts, was involved in an
automobile accident. 9 The plaintiff alleged that the treatment by
doctors and hospitals immediately after the accident negligently
failed to discover that her spine was fractured.20 Late in 1974, the
plaintiff sought the counseling services of Dan Hall, a family and
marital therapist, for treatment of stress caused by her husband's
drinking.21 During the course of her counseling, the plaintiff spoke
to the therapist about severe pain that she had been suffering since
the automobile accident.2 2 The plaintiff asserted that the therapist
tried to make her accept that her pain was predominantly emo-
tional rather than physical and that he discouraged her from see-
ing other doctors.2 3 The plaintiff continued counseling with Hall
until 1981. " Throughout this period the plaintiff's family was re-
peatedly harassed by calls from the therapist and the plaintiff al-
leged that the therapist made improper advances. 25
In light of her continuing pain, the plaintiff sought medical
advice of several additional doctors.26 These doctors were con-
tacted by Hall, who discussed the plaintiff's case with them even
though the plaintiff had not authorized him to do so.27 Conse-
quently, the doctors informed the plaintiff that her distress was
psychological rather physical. In May 1979, another doctor, Dr.
Coin, performed a scan and advised the plaintiff that she was suf-
17. 75 N.C. App. 1, 330 S.E.2d 242 (1985).
18. Id. at 5-12, 330 S.E.2d at 247-50.
19. Id. at 5, 330 S.E.2d at 246.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 13, 330 S.E.2d at 251.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 19, 330 S.E.2d at 254.
25. Id. at 14, 330 S.E.2d at 251.
26. Id. at 13, 330 S.E.2d at 251.
27. Id. at 8, 330 S.E.2d at 248.
28. Id. at 18, 330 S.E.2d at 254.
19851
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fering from a broken neck and spine.29 Dr. Coin found two neck
breaks on the original X-ray taken on the day of the plaintiff's ac-
cident.30 Thereafter, the plaintiff was treated first by Dr. Pennick,
then Dr. Toole. The plaintiff alleged these doctors discussed her
case with Hall, her therapist. 1 She claimed that these discussions
continued even after Hall had been dismissed as her therapist.32
In June 1982, the plaintiff filed an action against the Cumber-
land County Hospital System, seven doctors, North Carolina Bap-
tist Hospitals, Inc. and Dan Hall. 33 This action alleged negligence
in medical treatment and counseling, fraudulent concealment by
all parties of the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries, and
breach of fiduciary duty.3 The superior court granted summary
judgment for all defendants except Cumberland County Hospital
System who had failed to move for summary judgment.35 The su-
perior court found no genuine issue of material fact.3
The plaintiff brought two appeals from that decision. The first
appeal was based on whether the court erred in granting summary
judgment for Hall on the claims asserted by the plaintiff.37 The
second appeal was based on whether the court erred in granting
summary judgment for the hospital and doctors." The North Car-
olina Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment granted in
favor of the therapist Hall,3 9 holding that the complaint alleged all
essential elements of malpractice in the claim for breach of fiduci-
ary duties.40 The court based this decision upon Article 1B, Chap-
ter 90 of the North Carolina General Statutes, defining malpractice
actions, and upon N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.11, which defines the
term "health care providers." '41 The court further held that the
summary judgment denying the plaintiff's claim of negligence and
fraudulent concealment by the therapist Hall was improvidently
29. Id. at 19, 330 S.E.2d at 254.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 22, 330 S.E.2d at 256.
34. Id. at 5, 330 S.E.2d at 246.
35. Watts v. Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc., 74 N.C. App. 769,
770, 330 S.E.2d 256, 258, rev. denied, 314 N.C. 548, 335 S.E.2d 27 (1985).
36. 75 N.C. App. at 5, 330 S.E.2d at 246.
37. Id. at 6, 330 S.E.2d at 246.
38. 74 N.C. App at 770, 330 S.E.2d at 258.
39. Id.
40. 75 N.C. App. at 11-12, 330 S.E.2d at 250.
41. Id. at 8, 330 S.E.2d at 249.
[Vol. 8:145
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granted.42 The dissent to this opinion concurred that summary
judgment on the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence
should be reversed, but stated that the plaintiff's fraudulent con-
cealment claim was but another aspect of the malpractice claim.4"
BACKGROUND
Although the court in Watts was not willing to establish a sep-
arate breach of confidence tort, there is ample authority for it
based on both English and American law. The exact beginnings of
the breach of confidence action are unclear. English courts have
often granted recovery for wrongful disclosure based on a variety
of theories including property, contract and unjust enrichment."
The earliest English cases involving the breach of confidence issue
were based on the law of the common law copyright."
The first English case which actually recognized the breach of
confidence as a separate cause of action was the 1849 case of
Prince Albert v. Strange." In Prince Albert, royal etchings were
forged by a printer who also prepared a catalogue of them. 7 The
display or use of the copies by third parties could be enjoined since
these copies were protected under common law copyright princi-
ples as a form of expression.48 However, the catalogue was not a
form of expression but merely informational. 9 Information could
be protected only if disclosed in a confidential relationship.50 The
court held that an injuction was proper not only because the court
was willing to extend the property rights in the etchings to the
catalogue, but also based on alternate theories of breach of trust,
confidence and contract rights.51
Following this case, the English courts developed an extensive
body of law delineating the breach of confidence tort."2 The tort
42. 75 N.C. App. at 22, 330 S.E.2d at 256.
43. Id. at 22, 330 S.E.2d at 256. (Wells, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
44. The Law Commission, Breach of Confidence, No. 110, at 3.3 (H.M. Stat.
Off. 1981); see also Note, supra note 10, at 1452 n.132.
45. Id.
46. 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (Ch. 1849).
47. Id. at 1172.
48. Id. at 1178.
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also 3 M. NiMmm, ON COPYRIGHT § 16.01 (1982).
51. 41 Eng. Rep. at 1179.
52. See supra note 46.
1985]
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was expanded to cover wrongful disclosures in a variety of circum-
stances including banker-customer relationships, accountant-client
relationships, trade secrets and confidential commercial transac-
tions.53 In 1981, the British Law Commission suggested a statutory
reformulation of the breach of confidence tort into a single set of
principles to apply to all wrongful disclosures."
In contrast, in America the breach of confidence tort was em-
ployed by the judiciary only in isolated cases. Corliss v. E.W.
Walker Co., decided in 1894, was one of the earliest American
cases to recognize this tort." In Corliss, the wife of a deceased in-
ventor sought to enjoin publication of his portrait.'6 The court
stated that the engagement of a photographer to take a picture
"assumes the form of a contract; and it is a breach of contract, as
well as a violation of confidence, for the photographer to make ad-
ditional copies from the negative.' 57 However, the Massachusetts
court held that innocent third parties who had purchased pictures
of the deceased inventor could print them." This decision was
based on the grounds that third parties were not subject to the
confidence binding the photographer and had no notice of the
wrongful conduct of the photographer."'
Following the Corliss decision, the breach of confidence tort
broke into three separate bodies of law: common law copyright,
trade secrets, and personal breach of confidence.60 The common
law copyright and trade secrets law developed into extensive bod-
ies of law, each which included elements dependent on the breach
of confidence.61 However, breach of confidence as a separate tort
action was almost dormant until 1960.11 This dormancy was due
mainly to the development of the breach of privacy tort following a
1890 Harvard Law Review article by Warren and Brandeis, 3 which
proposed a constitutional right to privacy.
After 1960, the breach of confidence tort as a separate action
53. Note, supra note 10, at 1453.
54. Id. at 1453-54.
55. 64 F. 280 (C.D. Mass. 1894).
56. Id. at 281.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 282.
59. Id.
60. Note, supra note 10, at 1454 n.146.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
150 [Vol. 8:145
6
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss1/6
BREACH OF CONFIDENCE
appeared in an increasing number of cases."' The breach of confi-
dence tort emerged in relationships such as physician-patient, 5
banker-customer 6 and school-student."7 The physician-patient line
of cases appeared with the holding by the Utah court in Berry v.
Moench.6 There the parents of a patient's prospective bride
sought information about him from his pyschiatrist.6 9 The wrong-
ful disclosure of confidential information by the psychiatrist about
his patient gave rise to the patient's cause of action in libel.7 0 The
court stated that it was the doctor's duty not to discuss informa-
tion revealed in confidence, and that it was the policy of the law to
encourage confidential physician-patient relationships."'
Similarly, the New York court in Clark v. Geraci72 stated that
a patient has a cause of action against a physician for disclosing
information obtained in the physician's professional capacity. In
this case, the patient was a civilian employee of the United States
Air Force.73 He was fired after his employer received a letter from
his doctor stating that the patient's absences from work were due
to alcoholism. 7" The patient filed a complaint which alleged that
the doctor's disclosures of confidential information constituted
malpractice.7 5 Although the court noted that there was no common
law basis for the action, it concluded that statutory law regulating
physicians' conduct, accepted usage, and the Hippocratic oath pro-
vided grounds for the breach of confidence action.7
64. Note, supra note 10.
65. See, e.g., MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801; see generally
Note, To Tell Or Not To Tell: Physician's Liability For Disclosure of Confiden-
tial Information, 13 CUM. L. Rv. 617 (1983); Annot, 20 ALR.3D 1109 (1968).
66. See, e.g., Milohnich, 224 So. 2d 759; see generally Annot., 92 A.L.R2D
900 (1963).
67. See, e.g., Union Free School District, 67 Misc; 2d 248, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222.
68. 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
69. Id. at 195, 331 P.2d at 816.
70. Id. at 196, 331 P.2d at 817.
71. Id. at 197, 333 P.2d at 817. The court recognized the need to encourage
confidential relationships in this case. However, the court also recognized that
disclosure might be necessary to protect a third party's interests.
72. 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1960). This case is a good example of
the court's willingness to limit the breach of confidence tort in situations in which
there is an overriding concern. Here the doctor's duty to fully disclose to the gov-
ernment overrode his duty of confidentiality to his patient.
73. Id. at 566.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 567.
1985]
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The Pennsylvania court in Alexander v. Knight77 explained
that the physician owes a patient a duty of total care which in-
cludes a duty to refuse to aid the patient's opponent in litigation.78
The breach of confidence action in this case arose as a result of
injuries sustained by the plaintiff in an automobile accident.7 9 The
plaintiff claimed that the physician who examined her had deliv-
ered a copy of the examination report to the defendant's represen-
tative.80 The court noted, in dictum, that the doctor's disclosures
constituted a breach of confidence which was to be condemned."
The Supreme Court of New York in Felis v. Greenberg8 2 also
dealt with the duty of physician-patient confidentiality. The plain-
tiff alleged in Felis that her physician had intentionally submitted
a false report to her insurer.8 3 This report contained a diagnosis
which conflicted with an earlier diagnosis by the same physician.8"
The court held that the plaintiff's cause of action lay in tort, and
that the doctor's false report constituted an unlawful violation of
the confidential relationship of physician and patient.88 The court
based its reasoning upon the theory that there was a recognized
legal duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff which was
breached by the defendant's disclosure. 6
More recent examples of the judiciary's willingness to redress
wrongful disclosures in physician-patient relationships include
New York court decisions of Doe v. Roe87 and MacDonald v.
Clinger."8 In Doe, the doctor communicated information about her
patients to her husband who published a book of case studies.89
The book revealed intimate details of a patient's life including
thoughts, feelings, sexual fantasies and biographies.90 Although the
court discussed several different theories of liability, the court ap-
77. 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177 A.2d 142 (1962).
78. Id. at 80, 177 A.2d at 146.
79. Id. 177 A.2d at 142.
80. Id.
81. Id. The court condemned one doctor's role in inducing another doctor to
breach a confidential relationship with a patient.
82. 51 Misc. 2d 441, 273 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1966).
83. Id. at 290.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 93 A.D.2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1977).
88. 84 A.D.2d 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
89. 400 N.Y.S.2d at 671.
90. Id. at 678.
[Vol. 8:145
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peared to have relied on the tortious breach of confidence doc-
trine.91 Similarly, MacDonald stated that a wrongful disclosure by
a psychiatrist is a breach of confidence which gives rise to a tort
action.92 The psychiatrist had revealed information to the patient's
wife without the patient's consent which the patient claimed led to
the deterioration of his marriage.93 The MacDonald court acknowl-
edged that when a physician discloses personal information
learned in the course of treatment, the most appropriate theory of
recovery is based on the breach of confidence tort.94 The court
stated that "an action in tort for a breach of a duty of confidential-
ity and trust has long been acknowledged in the courts of this
state."95
Apart from the physician-patient relationship, the breach of
confidence tort has been applied in other confidental relationships.
For example, bankers have been subjected to liability under the
breach of confidence tort." The first such case was Peterson v.
Idaho First National Bank.97 The plaintiff's employer in Peterson
requested information on the finances of his employees from the
manager of a local bank.98 The bank supplied information which
revealed that the plaintiff was experiencing financial difficulty.9
The plaintiff brought an action alleging personal embarrassment
and loss of reputation. 100 The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the
complaint based on the violation of an implied contract and the
bank's duty of confidence. 10' A more recent case, Suburban Trust
Co. v. Waller,102 held that a bank was liable for a breach of confi-
dence involving one of its customers. The plaintiff cashed his fed-
eral tax refund check at the Treasury Department and deposited
the sequentially numbered bills in the bank.103 The bank notified
the police and supplied a photograph of the plaintiff which was
91. Id. at 677.
92. 446 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
93. Id. at 802.
94. Id. at 804.
95. Id.
96. See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.2D 900 (1963).
97. 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961).
98. Id. at 582, 367 P.2d at 286.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 583-89, 367 P.2d at 286-90.
102. 44 Md. App. 335, 408 A.2d 758 (1979).
103. Id. at 337, 408 A.2d at 760.
19851
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later falsely connected to a robbery.104 The court stated that the
false arrest of the bank's customer stemming from information
supplied by the bank was a violation of the bank's duty to main-
tain confidences. 05
Additionally, school-student,106 priest-penitent,1 0 7 attorney-cli-
ent,108 husband-wife 0 9 and administrator-patient 10 relationships
have been deemed confidential in a number of cases. The variety of
case law within which the breach of confidence tort appears indi-
cates that there is substantial authority to establish a separate tort
to remedy the problem of wrongful disclosure. 1 This tort has
been defined recently as a "limited duty that attaches to nonper-
sonal relationships customarily understood to carry the obligation
of confidence.1112 Recent decisions have indicated an increasing
trend toward recognition of the breach of confidence tort as a sepa-
rate cause of action.' 3
ANALYSIS
Although the breach of confidence tort has been utilized in
several jurisdictions '14 as a remedy for wrongful disclosures of per-
sonal information, this issue was not addressed in North Carolina
until Watts v. Cumberland County Hospital System, Inc.1 5 The
plaintiff in Watts brought a suit against her marital therapist for
wrongful disclosures of confidential information to third parties.1
In establishing whether the plaintiff had stated a claim for which
relief could be granted, the court listed four possible theories as
bases for the cause of action.1 ' While noting that courts consider-
104. Id. at 338, 408 A.2d at 761.
105. Id. at 339-46, 408 A.2d at 762-65.
106. See, e.g., Union Free School District, 67 Misc. 2d 248, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222.
107. See, e.g., Keenan, 47 N.Y.2d 160, 417 N.Y.S.2d 226.
108. See, e.g., In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1977).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1977).
110. See, e.g., Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct.
1944), aff'd mem., 269 A.D. 970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1945).
111. See supra notes 108-112.
112. Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. App. 1985).
113. See, e.g., FedeU, 127 Misc. 2d 124, 485 N.Y.S.2d 460; Humphers, 68 Or.
App. 573, 684 P.2d 581.
114. See supra note 9.
115. 75 N.C. App. 1, 330 S.E.2d 242 (1985).
116. Id. at 9, 330 S.E.2d at 248.
117. Id. The court listed four theories which included invasion of privacy,
breach of implied contract, breach of fiduciary duty or duty of confidentiality, and
[Vol. 8:145
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ing this issue had not agreed upon the "proper characterization of
the cause of action,"1 18 the North Carolina Court of Appeals la-
beled it as an action grounded in malpractice. 119 The court deter-
mined that the plaintiff had an implied statutory cause of action in
malpractice based upon Article 1B of Chapter 90 of the North Car-
olina General Statutes characterizing medical malpractice and
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-21.11 defining the term "health care
provider. 12 0
However, a closer scrutiny of the case authority on which the
court relied indicates that the court mislabeled this cause of ac-
tion. The court relied on Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 2'
which rejected a claim for malpractice as a remedy for wrongful
disclosure. In Humphers, the physician revealed his patient's name
to the patient's natural child who had been adopted.12 The court
narrowly defined the practice of medicine as active treatment and
indicated that a disclosure of confidential information after treat-
ment had been terminated was not included within the definition
of malpractice. 23 The court stated, "[ajn action for medical mal-
practice will only lie for activities in which the defendant was in-
volved in the practice of medicine.' 2' Although the court in
Humphers recognized two causes of action for wrongful disclo-
sures, invasion of privacy and breach of confidence,12 5 it refused to
recognize medical malpractice as an appropriate cause of action. 26
Malpractice was also rejected as a cause of action in wrongful dis-
closures by the New York court in Hammer v. Polsky. 1 7 The
Hammer court held that unprofessional conduct does not consti-
tute malpractice and dismissed the plaintiff's claim based upon the
insufficiency of the pleadings. 128
The Watts court also cited MacDonald v. Clinger.2 9 The New
York Supreme Court in MacDonald examined a number of theo-
medical malpractice.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 9, 330 S.E.2d at 249.
120. Id. at 9-10, 330 S.E.2d at 249.
121. 68 Or. App. 573, 684 P.2d 581 (1984).
122. Id. at 577, 684 P.2d at 584.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 578-84, 684 P.2d at 585-88.
126. Id. at 578, 684 P.2d at 585.
127. 233 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1962).
128. 233 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
129. 84 A.D. 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982).
1985]
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ries providing a cause of action for the wrongful disclosure of confi-
dential information. 130 Although it recognized an action in implied
contract, 131 the court also noted an additional cause of action
"springing from but extraneous to the contract and that breach of
such duty is actionable in tort."'1 31 Both Humphers and MacDon-
ald recognized a separate cause of action based upon the breach of
confidence tort. 33
The Watts court also cited the Alabama decision of Horne v.
Patton.' The court cited Horne as a case in which liability had
been imposed under more than one theory. 13 5 The Horne case
found three independent bases of liability: invasion of privacy,
breach of implied contract, and breach of confidence.1 36 Medical
malpractice was not advanced as a theory of liability.1 37 In fact, all
of the preceeding cases cited by Watts as persuasive authority are
analogous; they have all recognized the breach of confidence tort as
a separate cause of action to remedy wrongful disclosures of confi-
dential information and none of these cases set forth medical mal-
practice as a basis for recovery.
The court in Watts used Mazza v. Huffaker""8 as precedential
authority of North Carolina for characterizing wrongful disclosures
as malpractice. 3 9 In Mazza the patient brought a suit against his
doctor on the grounds of negligence. 40 The court stated that the
psychiatrist's conduct in having sexual relations with his patient's
spouse constituted a breach of duty to maintain the patient's
trust.' The court characterized the cause of action as malpractice
and awarded damages to the plaintiff.""
Watts and.-Mazza are distinguishable from one another. Al-
though both cases involved wrongful acts connected with medical
130. Id. at 483, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 802.
131. Id. at 484-86, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 803-04.
132. Id. at 486, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
133. See supra notes 133, 139.
134. 291 Ala. 701, 287 So. 2d 824 (1973).
135. 75 N.C. App. at 9, 330 S.E.2d at 248.
136. 291 Ala. at 706-11, 287 So. 2d at 827-32.
137. Id.
138. 61 N.C. App. 170, 300 S.E.2d 833, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 192, 305
S.E.2d 734 (1983), reconsideration denied, 313 S.E.2d 160 (1984).
139. 75 N.C. App. at 9-11, 330 S.E.2d at 249-50.
140. 61 N.C. App at 172, 300 S.E.2d at 835.
141. Id. at 176-77, 300 S.E.2d at 837-38.
142. Id. at 188-89, 300 S.E.2d at 844-45.
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treatment, 43 the issue steming from the wrongful disclosure of
confidential information in Watts is much broader than that posed
by the doctor's affair with his patient's wife in Mazza. Although
the court in Mazza discussed the duty of a doctor to act in the best
interest of his patient during the course of their relationship,4 the
court was mainly concerned with rectifying a breach that had al-
ready occurred. 45
In contrast, the issue of confidentiality in Watts is much
broader. The expectation of confidentiality is required even prior
to the establishment of a relationship so that the patient is willing
to reveal necessary information in the first place. 146 This expecta-
tion continues even long after the active relationship of doctor-pa-
tient has been discontinued. 47 It is doubtful that an affair by the
doctor with his patient's wife prior to the patient's treatment or
ten years after his treatment would give rise to a cause of action
for malpractice. However, the circumstances in Watts demonstrate
both the necessity of protecting the expectation of confidentiality
and the prevention of disclosure of confidential information during
and after the patient's treatment. The malpractice cause of action
which served well in Mazza is not broad enough to address the
interests in Watts.
Medical malpractice is inadequate to remedy wrongful disclo-
sures for several reasons."48 First, by limiting the remedy for
wrongful disclosure in Watts to medical malpractice, the North
Carolina court did not provide a remedy to prevent similar disclo-
sures in other confidential relationships. Therefore, while a disclos-
143. Id. at 175-76, 300 S.E.2d at 837; 75 N.C. App. at 4-5, 330 S.E.2d at 246.
144. 61 N.C. App. at 177, 300 S.E.2d at 838.
145. Id. at 174-75, 300 S.E.2d at 837.
146. See, e.g., Hague v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 181 A.2d 345 (1962), "A pa-
tient should be entitled to freely disclose his symptoms and condition to his doc-
tor in order to receive proper treatment without fear that those facts may become
public property. Only thus can the purpose of the relationship be fulfilled." Id. at
349.
147. See, e.g., Alberts v. Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113 (Mass. 1985). The court
found that confidentiality in doctor-patient relationships was so important that
the court stated a patient may hold liable one who induces a physician to violate
the duty of confidentiality. Id. at 121; see also, Humphers v. First Interstate
Bank, 68 Or. App. 573, 684 P.2d 581 (1984). The physician in Humphers wrong-
fully disclosed the patient's name to his child long after the active doctor-patient
relationship and was held in breach of confidence.
148. See, e.g., Humphers, 68 Or. App. 573, 684 P.2d 581, affirmed in part
and reversed in part, 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527 (1985).
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ure of personal information by a doctor about his patient could
give rise to a cause of action,'49 a disclosure of personal informa-
tion by a school about a student would not. 50 These results seem
unjustified. North Carolina has a strong interest in promoting a
variety of confidential relationships."5 Though societal interests
injured by wrongful disclosures are not exactly the same in each
case, every breach of a confidential relationship involves the same
general kind of wrongful disclosure regardless of the societal inter-
est injured. 62
Second, the medical malpractice theory is more difficult for
the plaintiff to prove than the occurrance of a wrongful disclosure
since it places additional burdens of proof on the plaintiff.153
Under the medical malpractice theory the plaintiff must show a
duty by the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct
and that the breach of that duty proximately caused the plaintiff's
injury.'5 Seemingly innocuous disclosures by the defendant which
do not violate the standard of conduct could violate a confidential
relationship if the information had special significance to the par-
ties involved or if the confessor is especially sensitive.
Case law, 5' the limited application,'" and the difficulty of
proof 57 dictate that malpractice is not the solution to solve wrong-
ful disclosures in confidential relationships.
Since the North Carolina court relied upon statutes to estab-
lish the cause of action in malpractice," 8 it is necessary to deter-
mine if these statutes are directly applicable to the issue of wrong-
149. Watts, 75 N.C. App. 1, 330 S.E.2d 242.
150. See, e.g., Student Bar Association Board of Governors v. Byrd, 293 N.C.
594, 239 S.E.2d 415 (1977). This case discussed the right by students to forbid
discussion of students in faculty meetings under the Family Education Rights and
Privacy Act of 1974 [41 F.R. 24662]. The court stated "[tjhe Buckley Amendment
does not forbid such disclosure of information concerning a student and, there-
fore, does not forbid opening to the public a faculty meeting at which such mat-
ters are discussed." Id. at 599, 239 S.E.2d at 419.
151. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-53 to 53.5.
152. Note, supra note 10, at 1434.
153. 75 N.C. App. at 11, 330 S.E.2d at 250. See also E. HIGHTOWER, NORTH
CAROLINA LAW OF DAMAGES § 36.13 at 434 (1981).
.154. 75 N.C. App. at 11, 330 S.E.2d at 250.
155. See supra notes 128, 134.
156. See supra notes 108-112 for other relationships for which a cause of ac-
tion should be established.
157. See supra note 160.
158. 75 N.C. App. at 9-10, 330 S.E.2d at 249.
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ful disclosure. Although N.C Gen. Stat. § 90-2.11 and Article 18C
of Chapter 90 do place marital therapists within the realm of
health care providers,' 5" it is unclear if the Legislature intended to
include wrongful disclosures by health care providers within the
statutory definition of medical malpractice. Article 1B, Chapter 90,
states that "a medical malpractice action is any action for damages
for personal injury or death arising out of furnishing or failure to
furnish professional services. . . ."0 The one question which
must be answered is whether the Legislature intended that the
term "personal injury" include the injuries normally suffered as a
result of wrongful disclosures: humiliation, loss of confidence and
deterioration of relationships. The court in Watts did hold that
the Legislature intended to include such injuries,"'1 but it relied
only upon Black's Law Dictionary1 6 2 to define the conduct in-
cluded in malpractice.0 3
The court avoided a more direct and effective approach to the
problem by its piecemeal efforts to fashion a remedy for wrongful
disclosure in this case.'" North Carolina courts could directly ad-
159. Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.11 defines "health care provider" as "any
person who pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 90 of the General Statutes is
licensed, or is otherwise registered or certified to engage in the practice of or oth-
erwise performs duties associated with any of the following: medicine, surgery,
dentistry, pharmacy, optometry, midwifery, osteopathy, podiatry, chiropractic, ra-
diology, nursing, physiotherapy, pathology, anesthesiology, anesthesia, laboratory
analysis, rendering assistance to a physician, dental hygiene, psychiatry, psychol-
ogy; or a hospital as defined by G.S. 131-126.1(3); or a nursing home as defined by
G.S. 130-9(e)(2); or any other person who is legally responsible for the negligence
of such person, hospital or nursing home; or any other person acting at the direc-
tion or under the supervision of any of the foregoing persons, hospital, or nursing
home . . . . "Article 18C of Chapter 90 provides for the certification of marital
and family therapists, and such persons" [who] clearly engage in the practice of or
otherwise perform duties associated with psychology." Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 864 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
163. 75 N.C. App. at 10, 330 S.E.2d at 249. This definition of malpractice
included "any professional misconduct, unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity in
professional or fiduciary duties, evil practice, or illegal or immoral conduct." Id.
164. Courts also fashion piecemeal remedies by a reliance on testimonial
privileges as a basis for liability for extrajudicial disclosures. Quarles v. Suther-
land, 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249 (1965). The purpose served behind permit-
ting a testimonial privilege in providing competent testimony is entirely different
than that served in protecting the revelations of confidential relationship.
Humphers, 68 Or. App. at 578-79, 684 P.2d at 585. The revelations of a confiden-
tial relationship may at times be outweighed by the need for judicial administra-
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dress the problem of wrongful disclosures by establishing a breach
of confidence tort. Many courts have included breach of confidence
as a remedy for wrongful disclosure. 16 5 A number of other courts
have yet to specifically recognize the breach of confidence tort but
have clearly applied the theory of the tort."'6 As stated by the
Supreme Court of New York in Doe v. Roe, "[iut is generally ac-
cepted that there is no necessity whatever that a tort must have a
name. New and nameless torts are being recognized constantly."16
The courts which have refused to recognize the breach of con-
fidence tort have usually done so based on a lack of statutory au-
thority.6 " At common law there was no legally recognized confi-
dential relationship between patient and physician 16 9 Courts have
also refused to remedy wrongful disclosures of confidential infor-
mation based on the absence of implied contract or the absence of
a doctor-patient relationship. 70 These cases usually involve a doc-
tor who has been employed by a third party to examine the pa-
tient.71 Other courts have been more subtle in their refusal to es-
tablish the breach of confidence tort as a separate action. These
tion. However, these same revelations not protected by a testimonial privilege
may need to be protected from extrajudicial disclosures. Therefore, the absence of
a privilege should not be controlling. Even if the testimony is barred at trial, the
statutory privilege is not intended to apply outside the judicial context and
should not be used as a basis of civil action. Id.
165. See, e.g., Humphers, 68 Or. App. 573, 684 P.2d 581 (1984), affirmed in
part, reversed in part, 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527 (1985); MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d
482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801; Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59, 479 N.E.2d 113 (1985);
but see Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. Ga. 1957); Boyd v. Wynn, 286
Ky. 173, 150 S.W.2d 648 (1941); Quarles v. Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d
249 (1965); Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1984).
166. See, e.g., Suburban Trust Co., 44 Md. App. 335, 408 A.2d 758; Doe, 93
Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668; Humphers, 68 Or. App. 573, 684 P.2d 581 (1984),
affirmed in part, reversed in part, 298 Or. 706, 696 P.2d 527 (1985); Fedell, 127
Misc. 2d 124, 485 N.Y.S.2d 460.
167. 400 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
168. Note, supra note 67, at 626; see also Collins v. Howard, 156 F. Supp. 322
(S.D. Ga. 1957); Boyd v. Wynn, 286 Ky. 173, 150 S.W.2d 648 (1941); Quarles v.
Sutherland, 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d 249 (1965); Logan v. District of Columbia,
447 F. Supp. 1328 (D.C. 1978); Coralluzzo v. Fass, 450 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1985).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Munzer v. Blaisdell, 183 Misc. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct.
1944), afj'd, 269 A.D. 970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1945); Collins v. Howard, 156 F.
Supp. 322 (S.D. Ga. 1957); Hammer v. Polsky, 36 Misc. 2d 482, 233 N.Y.S.2d 110
(Sup. Ct. 1962).
171. See, e.g., Collins, 156 F. Supp. 322; Quarles, 215 Tenn. 651, 389 S.W.2d
249 (1965).
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jurisdictions have protected confidential disclosures under other
established theories and have avoided recognizing a new breach of
confidence tort.1 2 The Watts decision falls into this category. The
North Carolina court addressed the breach of confidence problem
but limited it to an action for malpractice, thereby only providing
a partial remedy for wrongful disclosures.
North Carolina needs to be bold in its recognition of a new
tort. While the North Carolina court was willing both to provide a
remedy for extrajudicial disclosures and to cite cases which recog-
nized the breach of confidence tort,17 3 it was not bold enough to
establish a separate action on its own. Watts provided the North
Carolina court with an opportunity to establish the proper parame-
ters for a new tort which would directly address extrajudicial dis-
closures. By establishing such a tort the North Carolina court
would protect interests not directly protected by medical malprac-
tice statutes including "(1) the expectation of confidentially arising
from the assurance of secrecy and the reliance thereon; and (2)
freedom from circulation of damaging information. 1 7 4
Most of the problems associated with the recognition of the
breach of confidence tort could be easily eliminated by narrowing
the relationships included within it to "nonpersonal relationships
customarily understood to carry an obligation of confidence. ' 17 5
This standard was adopted recently by the District of Columbia in
Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's176 as the basis for liability in tort. This
standard recognizes that every "juicy rumor '177 cannot be quelled
and establishes only a limited duty not to reveal confidences. The
nonpersonal requirement removes friends and family from being
included under the tort, thus avoiding the evidentiary problems as-
sociated with that type of personal litigation. It also establishes the
"customarily" requirement which serves as a notice to defendants
of their duty. 7 8
Since there are some situations in which the disclosure of con-
fidential information is imperative, other limitations on this tort
.172. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668 (Sup. Ct. 1977);
Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, (N.D. Ohio 1965);
Vassiliades, 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. App. 1985).
173. 75 N.C. App. at 9, 330 S.E.2d at 248.
174. Note, supra note 10, at 1439.
175. Note, supra note 10, at 1468.
176. 492 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1985).
177. Union Free School Dist., 324 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
178. Note, supra note 10, at 1455-68.
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need to be established. The counterbalancing interests of society
require that in cases of public safety,179 health, 8 judicial adminis-
tration,"8 ' and the public right to know,18 1 the breach of confidence
tort may not apply. Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Califor-
nia 8 3 is a good example of circumstances in which public safety is
paramount to enforcement of the tort. In Tarasoff, the California
Supreme Court found there was a legal duty to breach the confi-
dence of a mental patient who had been diagnosed as dangerous
and did in fact kill his girlfriend after his release."" The court held
that in this case there was an affirmative duty to reveal the pa-
tient's communications 8 8 Public health is also an overriding con-
cern that outweighs the interest in keeping confidences. 86 Simi-
larly, judicial administration requires that when an incomplete
disclosure is made by a patient, the doctor who treated him should
be allowed to make a full disclosure. 187 Additionally, judicial privi-
leges or the lack of judicial privileges should not be affected by the
existence of this tort.' The need to report confidences to prevent
crime would also be a necessary limitation. 8 9 Finally, the public's
right to know in some circumstances could outweigh the interest of
keeping a matter in strict confidence. 90
Since a breach of confidence tort would directly address the
problem of extrajudicial disclosures, the other theories listed by
the North Carolina court, implied term of contract and invasion of
privacy, would not be necessary.' 9' However, in the absence of a
179. See, e.g., Berry, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814.
180. See, e.g., Simonsen, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831.
181. See, e.g., Boyd v. Wynn, 286 Ky. 173, 150 S.W.2d 648 (1941).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
183. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
184. Id. at 430-32, 551 P.2d at 339-40, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
185. Id. at 450, 551 P.2d at 353, 131 Cal Rptr. at 33.
186. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-15 (West 1964); Simonsen, 104 Neb. at 224,
177 N.W. at 831.
187. Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1960).
188. See, e.g., Humphers, 68 Or. App. at 580, 684 P.2d at 586.
189. See, e.g., State v. McCray, 15 Wash. App. 810, 551 P.2d 1376 (1976)
(summary of holding).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974). The court
would also need to limit this tort by making guidelines allowing information gath-
ering agencies to operate. See generally Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Un-
certain Role of the Physician in the Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C.L. REv.
255 (1984).
191. Watts, 75 N.C. App. at 9, 330 S.E.2d at 248.
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breach of confidence tort, neither of these theories adequately ad-
dress the issue of wrongful disclosures.
An expansive body of law has developed in the United States
on the tort of invasion of privacy. 92 The Oregon court in
Humphers193 stated that only one of the four types of invasion of
privacy was applicable to extrajudicial disclosures of a confidential
matter.'" That tort, as described by the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, is one in which:
There is likewise no liability unless the interference with the
plaintiff's seclusion is a substantial one, of a kind that would be
highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man, as the result of
conduct to which the reasonable man would strongly object.1 95
The court also noted that the tort for interference with seclusion
did not require publication as did all other types of invasion of
privacy.'98
While this type of invasion of privacy tort overlaps with the
breach of confidence tort, it would not provide a complete remedy
for wrongful disclosures. The interests protected by each tort are
different.'9 7 The breach of confidence tort protects an expectation
of secrecy and prevents the circulation of damaging information. 9 8
The invasion of privacy tort for interference with seclusion does
not protect the first interest at all and only. partially protects the
second. 199 The requirement that the interference be a substantial
and highly offensive one places a major limitation on the remedy
for this wrong. Confidences should be protected without regard to
their degree of offensiveness, since statements which would seem
unoffensive to a reasonable man could have special importance to
the parties concerned.20 0 This privacy standard also would not pro-
tect the highly sensitive person to whom disclosures could be very
192. Sloan & Hall, Confidentiality of Psychotherapeutic Records, 5 J. LEGAL
MED. 435-42. (1984).
193. 68 Or. App. 573, 684 P.2d 581 (1984).
194. 68 Or. App. at 583, 684 P.2d at 588.
195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 652B comment d (1977).
196. 68 Or. App. at 583, 684 P.2d at 588.
197. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 398 (1960). See also Note, supra
note 10, at 1439.
198. Prosser, supra note 197, at 398.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931),
superceded by statute, Robers v. Gulf Oil Co., 147 Cal. App. 3d 770, 195 Cal.
Rptr. 393 (1983).
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distressing even though the disclosures could not be highly offen-
sive to a reasonable man. Even the release of harmless confidences
could destroy the expectation of secrecy since the confider could
reasonably suspect that if one statement was released others would
be also.
All other branches of the invasion of privacy require publica-
tion.2 01 No cause of action exists unless the information has been
give out to the public at large.2 02 Therefore, cases involving disclo-
sures to a small number of people could result in a great injury
which would fail under the unwanted publicity branch of invasion
of privacy. 0 3 Since the privacy tort is a right against the public at
large, the conduct which violates it is narrowly limited so as not to
chill First Amendment freedoms. s°4 In contrast, the breach of con-
fidence tort is a right against a single individual based upon a rela-
tionship which has notice of the expectation of confidentiality. As
a result, the breach of confidence tort provides a broader remedy
for wrongful disclosures of confidential information than the pri-
vacy tort.20 5
Another theory listed by the North Carolina court as a cause
of action for wrongful disclosures was the breach of implied con-
tract.2 06 This theory has been used by a number of courts as a basis
for recovery since confidences are often disclosed in contractual re-
lationships. 207 The implied contract cause of action is founded on
the contract principle that promises are inferred from the conduct
of the parties, common usages, practices and understandings at the
,time of contracting.08 Courts have looked to licensing statutes, the
201. Other cases involving disclosures have based their decisions on another
aspect of the tort of invasion of privacy. This aspect protects against unwanted
publicity and is described by the RESTATEMENT as follows:
One which gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of an-
other is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the
matter publicized is of a kind that:
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
202. See generally Prosser, supra note 197.
203. See, e.g., MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801.
204. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied., 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
205. See generally, Note, supra note 10.
206. Watts, 75 N.C. App. at 9, 330 S.E.2d at 248.
207. See supra note 12.
208. E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 124 (1982).
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Hippocratic oath, and public policy as sources of justification in
which to find an implied promise not to disclose confidential infor-
mation.20 9 However, the implied contract action is also inadequate
since it protects interests different from those protected by the
breach of confidence tort.210
A comparison of the basic principles of law behind contract
and tort shows the stark differences between these theories. Con-
tract law is based on the consent of the parties 21 1 while tort law
does not depend on consent.212 The assurance of secrecy is not a
bargained-for exchange in a confidential relationship as an individ-
ual would bargain for additional service.213 Additionally, the prin-
ciples underlying the awarding of damages in these two areas of
the law are also different. Contract law enforces the expectation
interests of the parties21 4 while tort law compensates for injuries
suffered at the hands of another" 5 and deters negligent conduct of
the defendant. A number of courts have noted that the expectation
interest is inadequate in redressing wrongful disclosures..2 " The ex-
pectation interest objective is to provide for benefits reasonably
anticipated at the time of contracting. 7 This award is limited to
damages in contemplation of the parties at the time of con-
tracting.21 Since most parties do not anticipate disclosures of con-
fidential information at the beginning of the relationship, contract
damages do not provide a remedy for wrongful disclosures. As
noted by the New York court in MacDonald v. Clinger.
If plaintiff's recovery were limited to an action for breach of con-
tract, . . . he would generally be limited to economic loss flowing
directly from the breach and would thus be precluded from recov-
ery for mental distress, loss of his employment and deterioration
of his marriage.2 1
Another fatal flaw in applying a contract remedy to recover for
209. See, e.g., Doe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668.
210. See, e.g., MacDonald, 84 A.D.2d 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801.
211. See supra note 131.
212. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS, 102-08 (4th
ed. 1971)
213. Note, supra note 10, at 1445.
214. See generally FARNSWORTH supra note 208, at 839 (1982).
215. W. PROSSER, supra note 212, at 613.
216. See, e.g., MacDonald, 84 A.D. 482, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801.
217. FARNSWORTH, supra note 208, at 839.
218. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
219. 84 A.D. at 486, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 804.
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wrongful disclosures is that punitive damages are not readily avail-
able under contract law.220 Punitive damages are rarely given as a
contract remedy except when the breach of contract occurs in con-
junction with a tort for which punitives are allowed.2 1 The pain
and suffering caused by breach of confidence which could be de-
terred by punitives would remain unaddressed by the compensa-
tory damages of contract law. Therefore, the compensatory dam-
ages usually provided by contract law are wholly inadequate for
wrongful disclosures.
The establishment of a breach of confidence tort is necessary
to adequately protect against extrajudicial disclosures. Neither
medical malpractice, invasion of privacy, nor implied term of con-
tract fully protect the interests involved in confidential relation-
ships. The establishment of a breach of confidence tort, which di-
rectly addresses this problem, is needed.
CONCLUSION
In Watts, the North Carolina Court of Appeals sought to rem-
edy a wrongful disclosure by characterizing it as medical malprac-
tice. However, as a number of other jurisdictions have recognized,
the wrongful disclosure of confidential information is inadequately
remedied by medical malpractice statutes or by the other tradi-
tional remedies of breach of contract and invasion of privacy.
Rather, a new cause of action should be recognized which directly
proscribes disclosures of confidential information in any non-per-
sonal relationship customarily understood to carry an obligation of
confidence. Without such a cause of action, the court will be re-
quired to continue to indulge in the fiction apparent in Watts in
order to protect the interests of those who suffer from the indiscre-
tion of others.
Kathryn B. Remick
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981), citing 5 CoRBIN
CONTRACTS § 1019 at 113-15.
221. FARNSWORTH, supra note 208, at 842-43.
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